English football is underpinned by contradictions. It is simultaneously the richest, best and most deeply competitive in the world but it’s also standing on the edge of a financial disaster.
Revenues are at
£9bn
But losses are at
£Xm
17
clubs would be loss-making if their players played for free
More than
25%
of clubs wouldn’t survive the month if their owner stopped funding them
While revenues have ballooned, there have been winners and losers
01
Since 1992/93, average Premier League club revenues have grown over
30 times
their 1992 level. By comparison, UK GDP only increased by 3 times over the same period.
This has helped to establish the Premier League as the most valuable football league in the world. The combined total value of Premier League squads is estimated to be
€12.5 billion
more than double that of the squads of any of the other top five European leagues
However, the lower leagues have not been able to keep up. Gaps between the leagues have grown. Even within the Premier League, the big six have started to pull away.
In 1992/93, the highest earning Premier League club earned
70x
the revenue of the lowest earning Football League Division Three (i.e. EFL League Two) club.
By 2024/25 this had grown to
173x
English football generated around
£9bn
of revenue in 2025/26
The Premier League accounted for more than
80%
of revenues across the top five tiers of the pyramid.
The biggest six Premier League clubs accounted for
56%
of Premier League clubs’ revenues.
Revenues may have risen but so have costs
02
Player wage costs increased across all leagues between 2022/23 and 2025/26: [Note: these are the % increases in player wage costs for each league]
Premier League
14%
increase in player wage
Championship
44%
increase in player wage
League One
55%
increase in player wage
League Two
38%
increase in player wage
Player wages represent a significant proportion of clubs’ revenues, particularly below the Premier League.
19 clubs, primarily in the Championship, League One and National League, spent more than
80%
of revenue on player wages
5 clubs spent more than
100%
Transfer and agent costs have also risen significantly.
Between 2021/22 and 2025/26, annual transfer costs (amortisation) across the pyramid doubled
from
£1.3bn
to
£2.6bn
Total agent fees increased from
£317m
to
£484m
representing 17% of English clubs’ total transfer expenditure in 2025.
Average non-player costs have increased substantially across all divisions, with these costs making up a higher percentage of club expenditure towards the bottom of the pyramid
In 2025/26, 17 clubs across the EFL and National League had non-player costs that exceeded their total revenues, up from 12 in 2024/25.
These clubs would therefore have been loss making even if they didn’t pay their players.
Rising costs mean that clubs are increasingly loss-making and reliant on owner-funding
03
In 2025/26, 94% of clubs across the top five English leagues were loss making.
Average losses have increased substantially since 2021/22, although trends and the scale of losses relative to revenue vary across divisions:
Premier League
£20m
2021/22
Premier League
£44m
2025/2026
Championship
£11m
2021/2022
Championship
£22m
2025/2026
Premier League: Average losses more than doubled from £20 million in 2021/22 to £44 million in 2025/26, but remained at around 10% of revenues.
Championship: Average losses remained relatively stable between £11-£13 million until 2024/25, before increasing to £22 million in 2025/26, equivalent to around 60% of revenues.
League One
£2.3m
2021/22
League One
£7.5m
2025/2026
League Two
£0.6m
2021/2022
League Two
£2.7m
2025/2026
League One: Average losses more than trebled, from £2.3 million in 2021/22 to £7.5 million in 2025/26, and now exceed 60% of revenues.
League Two: Average losses increased more than fourfold from £0.6 million to £2.7 million over the same period, and now exceed over 40% of revenues.
Most clubs rely on external funding to support their operations, including owner funding, loans and other forms of financing reflecting persistent operating losses across the pyramid
On average, for every £1 a club earns in revenue:
A Premier League club requires
30p
in external financing
A Championship club requires
59p
in external financing
A League One club requires
75p
in external financing
A League Two club requires
27p
in external financing
A National League club requires
49p
in external financing
Across the top five divisions, at least 30 clubs received external financing equivalent to more than 50% of their revenues.
In the short-term, this means many clubs are on brink of financial distress
04
The vast majority of EFL and National League clubs have significantly negative operating cashflow, meaning that they burn cash as a result of day-to-day operations.
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Outside a transfer window, most clubs do not have sufficient liquid assets to cover their short-term liabilities and are reliant on funding from owners.
Between March 2025 and March 2026:
(66 clubs)
57%
of clubs received six or more owner funding injections
(27 clubs)
23%
received 12 or more
Of 110 respondents:
(71 clubs)
65%
of clubs reported that they could not survive for more than 90 days without new owner funding
(32 clubs)
29%
of clubs reported that they could not survive for more than 30 days
Despite this reliance on owner funding, the majority of EFL and National League clubs do not have a contingency plan if their owner becomes unable or unwilling to continue financing operations.
In the longer-term, the majority of clubs will be financially unsustainable
05
More than
60%
of EFL and National League clubs
and
20%
of Premier League clubs
have liabilities exceeding the book value of their assets. On an accounting basis, these clubs have negative equity and are technically insolvent.
Accounting for squad market values improves club’s solvency position, although
46%
of EFL clubs would still have negative equity.
27%
of EFL and National League clubs have combined financial and transfer debt exceeding the estimated saleable value of the business
Transfer debt is growing across the pyramid
06
Given the sums of money involved, English clubs will increasingly pay transfer fees in instalments, which means that each club will owe money to other clubs (‘transfer payables’) but will also be owed money by other clubs (‘transfer receivables’).
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In 2024/25, English clubs reported
£4.7bn
in transfer payables
In 2024/25, English clubs reported
£1.4bn
of transfer receivables
which means they have net transfer debt of approximately
£3.3bn
Part of the reason for the imbalance between transfer payables and receivables is the growth of transfer factoring.
Rather than waiting to be paid a transfer fee in instalments, clubs will ask a financial institution to provide funds immediately.
The financial institution will typically give a discounted amount to the club now in return for the future transfer fees.
This practice has significantly, rising from
£55m
in 2021/22
to
£779m
in 2024/25
with around
£1.2bn
of transfer receivables now monetised through financing arrangements.
This means that clubs are effectively spending tomorrow's income without paying tomorrow's debts. Given most clubs are loss-making, this debt will likely need to be paid through increased owner funding.
More broadly, transfer debt, deferred transfer payments and transfer financing create financial links between clubs, owners and lenders, increasing the potential contagion risk, where financial stress could spread across the game if one or more clubs fail to meet their obligations.
The distribution of revenues creates structural risks
07
There are significant financial cliff-edges across the football pyramid. The growth of Premier League broadcast revenues and current distribution arrangements have contributed to those cliff-edges, particularly across the Premier League and Championship.
In 2025/26 a Premier League club received up to
15x
as much domestic broadcast distributions as non-parachute Championship clubs.
whereas a year one parachute club received
5x
as much
This creates a financial risk upon relegation even with parachute payments in place. For clubs relegated from the Premier League in 2024/25, on average:
Total revenue fell by
(42%)
£70m
Wage costs fell by
(34%)
£29m
which failed to cover the revenue shortfall
As such, EBITDA, a measure of underlying profitability, fell by
(447%)
£32m
and external financing increased by
(15%)
£7m
This also creates an incentive for non-parachute Championship clubs to overspend to compete with parachute clubs and attempt to achieve promotion.
On average, non-parachute clubs spent
84%
of revenues on player wages
Compared with
57%
for parachute clubs.
Promotion to the Premier League would increase total revenues by
376%
and would significantly increase the enterprise value of the club.
Football faces a range of structural risks and issues
08
Football governance
The roles of the EFL, Premier League and UEFA have changed since 1992.
Their original focus was on growing the commercial value of their competition on behalf of member clubs
but all three have become far more committed to a dual commercial and regulatory role.
The introduction and enforcement of financial rules have been accompanied by legal challenges from clubs and the PFA, contributing to a more complex and litigious regulatory environment and higher central costs.
For example, Premier League administrative expenses have increased
from
£45m
in 2015/16
to
£212m
in 2024/25
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an increase of around
370%
Part of the significant increases in recent years relate to exceptional disciplinary cases.
Tensions between domestic and international competition organisers have increased, including disputes over regulation, revenue distribution and the increasingly congested fixture calendar.
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Future broadcast uncertainty
The multi-year nature of broadcast deals means that broadcast revenues are secured until at least 2027/28. However, the value of the next round of deals is uncertain.
Competition organisers may face challenges when they next go to market. The domestic market is maturing, with limited scope to increase the number of matches broadcast. Traditional broadcasters are also increasingly focused on profitability, while streaming platforms’ demand for live sports remains uncertain.
Given clubs’ reliance on broadcast revenues, any reduction could require them to absorb greater losses, reduce costs or sell assets
Investor Landscape
Across the English football pyramid, the frequency and value of majority and minority takeovers have increased in recent seasons.
There are a range of motivations for investing in a football club and a range of different types of owners. Those seeking financial returns tend to achieve it by growing the enterprise value of the club, which is typically calculated as a multiple of revenue.
The big six’s revenue multiples, and therefore their enterprise value, have increased significantly over time.
Investors themselves identified different financial risks and motivations across the football pyramid:
Premier League:
investors highlighted the significant revenue risks associated with relegation or failure to qualify for European competition.
Championship:
investors highlighted the high-risk, high-reward strategy of overspending in pursuit of promotion to the Premier League.
Below the Championship:
owners were more likely to emphasise community objectives over financial returns, with some having acquired clubs to prevent administration.
Indicative analysis of investor returns illustrates the financial risks associated with club ownership.
Between 2021/22 and 2025/26, on average, investors in clubs across the top four leagues
are estimated to have lost
41%
of their original investment, once both enterprise value changes and annual losses are factored in.
Over the same period, investment in the FTSE 100 would have generated a return of more than
36%
of clubs in top 5 English leagues believe they would not survive more than 90 days without owner funding
Estimated financial returns were strongly associated with sporting performance.
Promoted clubs generated an estimated return of
83%
rising to
187%
in the Premier League.
Clubs that remained in the same league had estimated average losses of
70%
Clubs that were relegated had estimated average losses of
72%
And there is room for improvement on fan engagement, corporate governance and EDI.
09
Fans are generally satisfied with opportunities to engage but are less convinced that clubs listen to and act on supporter views.
Supporter groups are similarly less positive about their influence: only 39% are satisfied with how fan views are considered in club decision-making and 37% with communication and transparency around those decisions.
Competition organisers have introduced rules and principles to strengthen EDI. But our analysis of publicly available data indicates that several groups with protected characteristics remain underrepresented across football clubs, particularly in leadership roles.
Football clubs employ a higher proportion of white people, with league averages ranging from
4 - 8%
higher than representation in their local communities.
Women are less represented at football clubs, with league averages ranging from
22 - 24%
lower than the UK population.
People with a disability are less represented across clubs, with league averages ranging from
10 - 12%
lower than the UK population.
So what is the IFR going to do about this?
10
Football finances are a complex ecosystem. There is no single, simple solution that will reduce financial risk without undermining the fundamentals that drive the financial success of the English game.
We have a 6-point action plan for football. By the time clubs are granted full licences by the IFR by May 2030, this plan will reduce systemic risk, improve club financial soundness, improve governance and fan engagement – as per the IFR’s statutory objectives.
1.
Revenue distribution should be reformed but changes should focus on financial stability not encouraging reckless spending
2.
Leagues, clubs and other stakeholders should take action to reduce financial losses.
3.
Action should be taken at National League level to ensure football governance matches the risk within the game
4.
Clubs must improve how they manage financial risk
5.
Clubs must show how they take fans’ views into account
6.
Clubs should improve Corporate Governance and make progress on EDI
